- Jason Davis
The theme most prevalent thus far in Jurgen Klinsmann's tenure as USMNT head coach - all month and change of it - is the movement towards integrating America's abundant Latin soccer influence into the team. In part because Klinsmann has made it his cause cause célèbre (in concert with imbuing in the team a more attacking, fluid style - more on that in a minute), we can't go more than a few hours without a new piece waxing on about it, without the Paul Gardners of the world bellowing "FINALLY!" at people on the street, or without the overarching generalizations that are part and parcel of sweeping soccer-style speak.
There are only so many ways to describe the possession-based, pass heavy, high pressure, attack-minded style of play that Klismann is intent on imposing on his new team. Barcelona and Spain play the celebrated "tiki-taka", and are the undisputed champions of the modern standard. On this side of the world, it's called the "Latin style" due to the regional influence of Mexico, where possession is valued from the youngest levels of the game all the way through to the national team. Forgiving a nuance here or there lost on 95% of the soccer-viewing public, they're essentially the same thing, an idealized way of playing that embodies more of the "beautiful" in "the beautiful game" than any other style. Hence the appeal, and why Klinsmann's experiment has bought him patience on the part of the USMNT fan base. It a seismic shift. Those only happen slowly, with plenty of upheaval.
Showing posts with label player development. Show all posts
Showing posts with label player development. Show all posts
Claudio Reyna, the respected former player and current Youth Technical Director of U.S. Soccer, recently presented the U.S. Soccer Curriculum to help guide coaches towards the ultimate objective of producing professional American players capable of seriously competing for a World Cup. The comprehensive, 123-page document, covering almost every aspect of the youth game, foremost stresses “development over winning” for soccer clubs across the nation. No experienced soccer coach would argue with the philosophy or content of the plan. Yet the great difficulty is the implementation: how to actually go beyond words and take that step onto the playing fields across the country.
- Jason Davis
- Jason Kuenle
As the US talent pool has developed, the league’s ability to attracted foreign players has increased, and the league generally has matured, the diversity of formations and tactics in MLS has grown. Successful tactics hinge on two primary factors: 1) the individual skills of a team’s players and 2) the tactics and skills of your opponent. In other words, soccer tactics is a chess match; you can make moves with your pieces, but to be effective, those moves need to take advantage of the openings being offered by your opponent. While I hope to analyze how opponent tactics and skills affect MLS formations throughout the summer, the more straightforward analysis is on the chess pieces themselves.
As the US talent pool has developed, the league’s ability to attracted foreign players has increased, and the league generally has matured, the diversity of formations and tactics in MLS has grown. Successful tactics hinge on two primary factors: 1) the individual skills of a team’s players and 2) the tactics and skills of your opponent. In other words, soccer tactics is a chess match; you can make moves with your pieces, but to be effective, those moves need to take advantage of the openings being offered by your opponent. While I hope to analyze how opponent tactics and skills affect MLS formations throughout the summer, the more straightforward analysis is on the chess pieces themselves.
The relative cheapness of US talent is caused by a host of factors including MLS’ single entity structure, European foreign player limits, and the US not having a mother nation that has an expedited passport process for nationals of former colonies. These factor, combined with a limited number of foreign slots, create a dynamic that places a premium on using foreign talent to fill holes in US development. This allows an analysis of MLS players to be a approximate reflection on US player development. The first part of this analysis looks at where managers have most often looked for talent outside of the US to fill out their first team rosters.
There are many difficulties in creating the list that underlies this chart (i.e. should a player be classified as a center mid or a defensive mid or who is first choice for San Jose right now), but I don’t believe that there is any systematic bias that brings the results into serious question. Not surprisingly, this chart reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the national team pool; depth on the right and in more defensive midfield positions, left midfield covered well by inverting a right footed midfielder, reasonable depth, though in transition, at centerback. Also, there is a noticeable lack of strikers, attacking midfielders (either in a No. 10 role or as a more attacking box-to-box midfielder), and left backs. It underscores that MLS coaches know the limitations of the domestic player pool and have done a reasonable job augmenting it.
With every team in MLS playing a two centerback system, it is perhaps easiest to explore the use of players as chess pieces there. Tangible examples of combinations possible can be seen in the pairings of Marshall-James, Ream-Marquez, and Borchers-Olave. In functionality, the Marshall-James pairing in function reminds me of the Marshall-O’Rourke pairing in the Crew’s double winning 2008 season. O’Rourke and James fill similar roles, with their strength in covering space balancing well with Marshall’s marking and aerial abilities. The combination of Ream and Marquez are likely the best passing centerback combo in league history. The quality of their deliveries helps create the fluid attacking style that Hans Backe has put together in New York. The aerial prowess of Olave and Borchers protects RSL from crosses played from wide spaces, the tactical area of weakness when playing a diamond midfield. These are all examples of how, on a most basic level, pieces work together.
The above examples intentionally use a domestic-international pairing. It, in part, highlights a lack of diversity in the US central defender player pool. While anecdote does not equal data, looking at Americans in MLS who played centerback throughout college gives us an idea about the development of domestic talent. By grouping these centerbacks in age ranges, we can compare the play style diversity of each age range. The below chart is approximately in order from oldest to youngest.
The 28+ crowd consists of a fairly uniform type of player; a bigger, stronger centerback who is good in the air and a solid interior defender. In the 25-28 range, you continue to see that model of defenders in Brunner, Marshall, and Janicki, but you all see the emergence of a “utility” defender. These defenders, like Moor, Besler, and Hernandez, while primarily centerbacks, have some positional flexibility allowing them to move more easily into side back or defensive midfielder roles. Within this same age range, the “utility” role also developed in the reverse as players like Marvell Wynne (age 25), Heath Pearce (26), and before he left the league Jonathan Bornstein (26) all moved in from the side, while players like Danny O’Rourke (27), Geoff Cameron (25), Brandon McDonald (25), Patrick Ianni (25), and George John (24) have moved back to central defense either temporarily or permanently. This should not be overly surprising as the earlier chart demonstrated that the US over produces defensive midfielders and right backs.
However, in the 19-23 age range, the central defenders more naturally reflect the diversity required of different tactical systems. While there is still the prototypical back of the 28+ crowd, in a back like Omar Gonzalez, the diversity of the younger backs means getting solid delivery out of the back, no longer a team to move a Geoff Cameron-type from the midfield, they can instead choose Tim Ream and not have to trade defensive training and experience for passing proficiency. A team looking for more speed in its central defensive pairing, no longer needs to pull in a Marvell Wynne-type player from the wing, but can choose Ike Opara or A.J. DeLaGarza.
Again, this is all anecdotal, but if what is occurring in the center back position also occurs throughout the field, it seems likely that MLS coaches will have an increasingly diverse set of players on which to draw on, especially taken in combination with the growing international stature of MLS. Hopefully, this increases the diversity of play, the diversity of systems that coaches are comfortable with implementing, and the development of unique styles of play within MLS. The process of having our domestic pool produce the full array of chess pieces is the gateway to formation flexibility both for MLS and ultimately for the USMNT.
| MLS First Choice Players and National Origin | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Position | Number | Domestic* | US Developed | Foreign | Percent |
| CF | 30 | 8 | 1 | 21 | 70.0% |
| CM | 14 | 6 | 0 | 8 | 57.1% |
| LB | 18 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 50.0% |
| AM | 9 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 44.4% |
| LM/LW | 18 | 10 | 0 | 8 | 44.4% |
| CB | 36 | 21 | 0 | 15 | 41.7% |
| DM | 19 | 11 | 2 | 6 | 31.6% |
| RM-RW | 18 | 13 | 1 | 4 | 22.2% |
| RB | 18 | 14 | 0 | 4 | 22.2% |
| * Domestic includes Canadians playing in Canada and all US nationals | |||||
There are many difficulties in creating the list that underlies this chart (i.e. should a player be classified as a center mid or a defensive mid or who is first choice for San Jose right now), but I don’t believe that there is any systematic bias that brings the results into serious question. Not surprisingly, this chart reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the national team pool; depth on the right and in more defensive midfield positions, left midfield covered well by inverting a right footed midfielder, reasonable depth, though in transition, at centerback. Also, there is a noticeable lack of strikers, attacking midfielders (either in a No. 10 role or as a more attacking box-to-box midfielder), and left backs. It underscores that MLS coaches know the limitations of the domestic player pool and have done a reasonable job augmenting it.
With every team in MLS playing a two centerback system, it is perhaps easiest to explore the use of players as chess pieces there. Tangible examples of combinations possible can be seen in the pairings of Marshall-James, Ream-Marquez, and Borchers-Olave. In functionality, the Marshall-James pairing in function reminds me of the Marshall-O’Rourke pairing in the Crew’s double winning 2008 season. O’Rourke and James fill similar roles, with their strength in covering space balancing well with Marshall’s marking and aerial abilities. The combination of Ream and Marquez are likely the best passing centerback combo in league history. The quality of their deliveries helps create the fluid attacking style that Hans Backe has put together in New York. The aerial prowess of Olave and Borchers protects RSL from crosses played from wide spaces, the tactical area of weakness when playing a diamond midfield. These are all examples of how, on a most basic level, pieces work together.
The above examples intentionally use a domestic-international pairing. It, in part, highlights a lack of diversity in the US central defender player pool. While anecdote does not equal data, looking at Americans in MLS who played centerback throughout college gives us an idea about the development of domestic talent. By grouping these centerbacks in age ranges, we can compare the play style diversity of each age range. The below chart is approximately in order from oldest to youngest.
| Age Range | Players |
| 28+ | Gregg Berhalter, Jimmy Conrad, Eddie Robinson, Jay DeMerit, Danny Califf, Cory Gibbs, Nat Borchers, Jeff Parke, Bobby Boswell, Scott Palguta |
| 27-24 | Ryan Cochrane, Jason Hernandez, Ty Harden, Drew Moor, Steve Purdy, Bobby Burling, Chad Marshall, Greg Janicki, Eric Brunner, David Horst, Raushawn McKenzie, Matt Besler, Darrius Barnes |
| 23-19 | Sean Alvarado, Kwame-Watson-Siriboe, Michael Holody, Chris Sculer, Tim Ream, A.J. DeLaGarza, Ike Opara, A.J. Soares, Omar Gonzalez, Jalil Anibaba, Ethan White, Sacir Hot |
The 28+ crowd consists of a fairly uniform type of player; a bigger, stronger centerback who is good in the air and a solid interior defender. In the 25-28 range, you continue to see that model of defenders in Brunner, Marshall, and Janicki, but you all see the emergence of a “utility” defender. These defenders, like Moor, Besler, and Hernandez, while primarily centerbacks, have some positional flexibility allowing them to move more easily into side back or defensive midfielder roles. Within this same age range, the “utility” role also developed in the reverse as players like Marvell Wynne (age 25), Heath Pearce (26), and before he left the league Jonathan Bornstein (26) all moved in from the side, while players like Danny O’Rourke (27), Geoff Cameron (25), Brandon McDonald (25), Patrick Ianni (25), and George John (24) have moved back to central defense either temporarily or permanently. This should not be overly surprising as the earlier chart demonstrated that the US over produces defensive midfielders and right backs.
However, in the 19-23 age range, the central defenders more naturally reflect the diversity required of different tactical systems. While there is still the prototypical back of the 28+ crowd, in a back like Omar Gonzalez, the diversity of the younger backs means getting solid delivery out of the back, no longer a team to move a Geoff Cameron-type from the midfield, they can instead choose Tim Ream and not have to trade defensive training and experience for passing proficiency. A team looking for more speed in its central defensive pairing, no longer needs to pull in a Marvell Wynne-type player from the wing, but can choose Ike Opara or A.J. DeLaGarza.
Again, this is all anecdotal, but if what is occurring in the center back position also occurs throughout the field, it seems likely that MLS coaches will have an increasingly diverse set of players on which to draw on, especially taken in combination with the growing international stature of MLS. Hopefully, this increases the diversity of play, the diversity of systems that coaches are comfortable with implementing, and the development of unique styles of play within MLS. The process of having our domestic pool produce the full array of chess pieces is the gateway to formation flexibility both for MLS and ultimately for the USMNT.
- Ben McCormick
America’s youth development took a huge step forward on April 21 when Youth Technical Director Claudio Reyna presented his curriculum for coaches across the country. The first step in standardizing youth development in America’s complex and convoluted youth system, the curriculum brings a small step America closer to forming a uniquely American player and playing style.
America’s youth development took a huge step forward on April 21 when Youth Technical Director Claudio Reyna presented his curriculum for coaches across the country. The first step in standardizing youth development in America’s complex and convoluted youth system, the curriculum brings a small step America closer to forming a uniquely American player and playing style.
- Jason Davis
Paul Kennedy calls for the end of the Bradenton academy over at Soccer America today. As I read his reasons, I found myself mentally nodding along; Bradenton's purpose, to give a select few the opportunity to jump start professional careers outside of the traditional American amateur club->college soccer->professional soccer path, thereby hopefully improving the fortunes of US national teams, is being served by other options these days. In other words, without a pressing need, Bradenton's usefulness (bang for its buck, return on the investment, etc.) has run its course.
Paul Kennedy calls for the end of the Bradenton academy over at Soccer America today. As I read his reasons, I found myself mentally nodding along; Bradenton's purpose, to give a select few the opportunity to jump start professional careers outside of the traditional American amateur club->college soccer->professional soccer path, thereby hopefully improving the fortunes of US national teams, is being served by other options these days. In other words, without a pressing need, Bradenton's usefulness (bang for its buck, return on the investment, etc.) has run its course.
Pending a rubber stamp from the Board of Governors, MLS will lift the current restrictions on the number of academy (home grown) players teams can sign to their roster in a given year.
First it was two, then it was four, and soon it will be "as many as you can churn out."
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| Adrián Ruelas of Santos Laguna and Fontana, CA |
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| More from this guy |
The conclusion was naturally drawn immediately and categorically: MLS missed on Peterlin. Whether and of the clubs in Peterlin's home state of California or the league as a whole, indictments rained down. If Everton thought he was good enough, why didn't anyone in MLS?
I wrote at the time that Everton's money and situation allowed them to sign Peterlin simply based on his potential. Without salary caps or roster restrictions and operating on a much bigger budget than anyone here, manager David Moyes could bring Peterlin over after an 8-day trial because he had the luxury. No such thing was possible in our domestic league, where every roster spot is precious and money is tightly watched. It's very possible one or more MLS coaches thought highly of Peterlin. They just weren't in a position to sign him if he wasn't ready to play right away.
That is a problem to be tackled, of course, though I suspect things will slowly get better over time. But any criticism of the individual teams and their ability to spot talent should be tempered now, with the news that Peterlin is no longer with Everton and is on the verge of signing with Plymouth.
Plymouth. Late the club of Kenny Cooper and former Revs coach Paul Mariner who "helped" them to relegation last season (I know that's a bit harsh...sorry), Plymouth will play the upcoming season in League One.
I don't know about you, but I find it hard to get too worked up over MLS missing out on a player who might get his first first-team minutes in the third tier of English football at the age of 23.
Again, I'm not glossing over the issues facing American soccer when it comes to scouting and development. By all rights, Peterlin should have been in a system somewhere six years ago, developing his game. If he turned into a quality player, he'd presumably already be in MLS, a homegrown talent brought into the professional ranks by a proper setup run by a club.
The system may have failed with Peterlin, but the coaches and front office staff themselves did not. It looks to me like David Moyes took a shot and missed. That is not a first, it won't be a last, and it happens regularly. Everton can afford to fire wildly in an effort to hit one target. MLS clubs have much less ammunition.
It was easy to go apoplectic last year when it looked like our league had overlooked real talent in its own back yard. David Moyes and Everton seemed to expose all of Major League Soccer's problems in one fell swoop. But the problem wasn't the evaluators of talent on MLS club payrolls, but the system they relied on to bring them players. The league is moving in the right direction in that regard, and while it's easy for the rest of us to spend their money, we should give credit where credit is due.
Maybe Anton Peterlin could have been Tristen Bowen or Andy Najar. Or maybe he was always destined to end up on a League One level. Hindsight and all that.
by Brian Mechanick
The 2010 MLS All-Star Game roster has been named, and the league’s fans are licking their chops at the prospect of chopping down Manchester United. Complaints about the roster are valid, there is no way Jaime Moreno deserved to make the All-Star team more than Real Salt Lake’s Costa Rican sensation Álvaro Saborío. But ultimately, your view on the MLS All-Stars depends on your view on the game itself. Is the game about winning and earning respect for the league or displaying MLS’s brightest prospects?
MLS loves to advertise its record in All-Star games, posting a 5-1 record versus foreign club teams (and the only loss coming in penalties vs. Everton last year). The league’s performance is elucidating to its supporters and misleading to its haters. The glass half-full view is that by beating sides such as Chelsea, Celtic, and Fulham, there is talent in this league that contend with the world’s best (just look at the Galacticos they beat on Chelsea in 2006). The anti-MLS contingent contends that they take advantage of out of form teams treating the game as a glorified training session. Ultimately though, it is telling that a team of MLS stars having trained together for a matter of days can consistently beat well-tuned and supremely talented European sides.
The make-up of the roster brings up questions to MLS’s skill at developing domestic talent. Thirteen domestic players are on the 24-man team, with 12 Americans and perhaps most alarmingly, only one Canuck in Dwayne DeRosario. It has long been debated whether MLS has a responsibility in: A. putting a premium on developing domestic talent, and B. selling these same players to European sides to continue their development. If MLS says yes to A, and especially B, they would be wise to give a special opportunity to young domestic talents. One match can change a career: after one pre-season match Jay DeMerit went from 7th division English soccer to Watford, and it took one brilliant performance from Cristiano Ronaldo to urge Manchester United’s players to convince Sir Alex Ferguson to sign the young Sporting product. Perhaps the 2010 contest could launch the first American into the Red Devils’ first team since Tim Howard in 2003.
In the end, MLS needs to find a balance between this piece’s original question to help both the league and North American soccer. To gain the respect of the American sports fan the league cannot become like those of South America, marketing its young talents for the pursuit of profit. However, young domestic talent is key to the growth of not only MLS, but also the two soccer federations that the league represents. MLS needs to prove that is a producer of young talent, not the place where former stars are put out to pasture, as some foreign football fans believe.
The All-Star game provides a grand opportunity to continue to gain respect for the league internationally and domestically. Those who were captivated this summer by the World Cup will take notice if Manchester United falls at the sword of MLS’s best. On a Wednesday night in the deadest part of the sporting calendar, the league has to hope that a strong performance against the world’s most famous side will both validate the fandom of its most devoted fans and convert the casual soccer fan to new MLS supporters.
World Cup success is determined in a narrow, interminably cruel window of four weeks, usually less for those not traditional powers, once every four years. Through the collision of time, money, effort, coaching, tactics, health, form, draw, and referees, a singular determination is made about the relative quality of a national team program based on a handful of games.
For the also-rans, the U.S., England, and a host of others, the self-examination that takes place even as hope and dreams are still smoldering is painful and invasive. The crashing out of the senior team, made up of men who are as much chosen warriors tasked with glorifying entire nations as they are mere footballers hoping to win a trophy, represents the failures of complex machines of development meant to spring them upon the world fully-formed and capable of delivering. The fruit is rotten, but it's the seed with which we become obsessed.
A wrinkle in time brings the chosen's successors to the forefront in a rush of renewed hope, even as we're unable to identify them definitively. Never mind that the players likely to represent us in four years are already too far along to be affected by any change made now; this is myopia, extended, and an approach that failed to produce a winner, even if the approach itself has been rehashed and revamped since directly impacting the men who wore the shirt last, cannot be allowed to stand. Steps taken in the interlude are meaningless or overlooked, or if they are noted, are assumed to be part of the same flawed thinking that brought us the most recent painful end.
For the developing soccer nation, the one perhaps on the rise but likely not because things are NOT MOVING FAST ENOUGH, a crisis of confidence leads to panicked assertions and pained howling. Fix it, it's all a jumbled mess, upside down and reversed and inside out and it's holding us back, and we just can't take it anymore. We know in our guts that this isn't right, that our development is stunted, and if only the stirred the pot faster it will give us magical results.
But stirring, constantly and vigorously, might mean our weightiest natural talents never have a chance to settle. Without trust that at some point in the past we got something right, without seeing it through, we might never know if we hit on the right formula. Our perspective is a function of time, and the danger lies in giving too much weight to the vagaries of the four week window that just ended. One or two more victories and our angst may have never erupted; a spot in the quarterfinals, which may have come with just one less mistake, and most of the problems that today we're so sure exist might otherwise be obscured. Our perspective, changed.
But mistakes were made; there is no reason to rest. What we've done in an effort to produce American players of whom we can be proud is simply not enough.
It will never be enough, not until our players return victorious with golden trophy in hand and the nation rises in celebration. That dream won't allow us to just let things be. Critical evaluation will never stop as long as that dream remains out of reach, and if that means calling for overhaul at every turn while ignoring the practical applications of our learned recommendations, so be it. We can see it, WHY CAN'T THEY? They, the ones in positions to mold our young hopes, are simply not listening, are surely ignoring the obvious, must be guilty of corruption or worse. Why else are we underachieving?
If we're not harrumphing over broken pipelines, we're dreaming of what is just emerging from them. The names are flowing, and even though many of them have yet to produce a drop of professional results, they're already causing us to leap ahead four years to when the window opens again. Our highly-touted youngsters are sure to burst onto the world scene, lifting us to new heights where their outgoing predecessors were unable; broken or not, the pipeline brings us something, and the promise is enough to let us believe it will be an undoubtedly richer batch.
Despair and hope, muddled together in a expectant fan base desperate for an American mark, a deep and meaningful one, on the soccer world. Our insecurities make us mad. Our love of the game and our teams make us uproariously passionate.
Let us take solace in the truth that mad and passionate is better than just mad.
Image Courtesy NASL.com
by Adam Soucie - Captain Positive
It is a commonly forgotten reality that sports teams are businesses. The theses in Soccernomics aside, the goal of any professional sports team is to make money. Traditionally, owners make money by building the value of a franchise over time and then selling it. During that time period, the team usually loses money (or makes very little). It is the basic concept of investing. You have to spend money to make money. Soccer is no different. Until now.
It seems that some NASL teams have found a new business model. Leading the charge is Traffic Sports Football Management, owners of NASL club Miami FC and co-architects of the new NASL itself. Traffic is a fitting name for this movement’s leaders for a simple, albeit cryptic, reason. With the way they are handling recent player loans, Miami FC, Crystal Palace Baltimore, and Whitecaps FC of Vancouver are participating in human trafficking.
Before you label me Sepp 2.0, understand that I’m not implying ANY mistreatment of these players or claiming they are being forced against their will here. I have no doubt the players in question are well aware of the clubs’ intentions and are the reason they entered the deals to begin with. In every case except one (Bryan Arguez), the players in question are under the age of 18 or have just turned 18. Because FIFA does not allow players under the age of 18 to sign multi-year contracts with a club outside of their own country (or their country of residence, to be more specific). FIFA rules practically necessitate a middle man. At the very least, they create the market for this kind of business.
For Part I of this story I’m going to focus on the player that inspired me to write this piece in the first place: former US U-17 midfielder Korey Veeder. It was announced yesterday by the NASL, and was the lead story on the league’s site no less, that Veeder was signed by Crystal Palace Baltimore. At first glance, the headline sounds like a great thing for the NASL. Once you begin reading the press release, the veil is lifted.
As I understand it, Veeder will never suit up for Crystal Palace Baltimore. He will train with the team, or at least will train in the same city, but he is due to be sent over in several weeks. Specifically, he will be joining the team’s parent team in the England’s Coca-Cola Championship League, Crystal Palace. After training with Palace, he is due to be loaned out. A borrower has yet to be found.
None of these seems sinister, and in no way am I saying it is. What bothers me is that the NASL is trumpeting Veeder’s signing. He has nothing to do with the NASL at all. Palace has been after Veeder for two years. They admit as much in the press release. FIFA regulations and EU/Great Britain laws are the only reason Veeder isn’t playing for Palace right now. The question remains, what does this have to do with the NASL?
Veeder’s situation is ultimately vanilla. His story only scratches the surface of this problem. Next I’ll take a look at the journey of Bryan Arguez and examine how he went from the 11th overall pick of the 2007 MLS Superdraft to loan fodder for Traffic Sports.
Cross-posted to Captain Positive
The United States National Team holds an annual camp, accompanied by a friendly, each January at the national training center (aka the Home Depot Center) in Carson, California. Called various disparaging names and viewed almost as a "tryout" camp, the players invited are rarely the type to excite most fans.
If that's the case, then what's the point? Jamie Trecker doesn't seem to think there is one, and wonders why US Soccer is writing checks for an exercise that simply won't unearth any new gems.
To be honest, I hadn't thought of it in those terms. The January camp just is and going beyond a basic evaluation of the names called up never occurred to me. But Jamie's point is well taken, especially with 2010 being a World Cup year; only a handful of names on Bradley's camper list have any chance of making the team for South Africa.
I'm not sure any reasonably-knowledgeable fan views the camp as preparation for the World Cup in any meaningful sense; as Trecker says, that process won't begin until the full team is together for their March friendly with the Netherlands. I've not really seen any indication from US Soccer that this camp is being portrayed as somehow important to the World Cup effort, but maybe I'm missing something. It would obviously be disingenuous of them to do so.
But I'll play devil's advocate and argue that the camp does serve a purpose. It's about the future, the endemic lack of depth, and is in fact an indirect commentary the condition of American player development.
Thanks to the convoluted, generally broken, and completely inefficient infrastructure the United States has for bringing along young players, the path to national team contributor is rarely a straight line. Too many players meander through the system, get passed over for the youth internationals, or are never found in the first place. For every Landon Donovan or Jozy Altidore, there are players like Alejandro Bedoya and Marcus Tracy, who while not exactly unknowns, are a much slower track to a National Team runout.
The United States regularly produces players that do not become professionals until their early twenties. While their contemporaries around the world have been living and breathing the game as pros for several years, American "kids" are only beginning to make their names in places like the US, Sweden, and Denmark when they emerge from US college soccer. This means that evaluating them as potential National Team contributors is almost impossible until they're in their early twenties. Even then, many are either not ready, needing more time as pros to improve their game, or never will be ready because they're simply not good enough.
Taking a quick and dirty look, here are some of the guys that fits that first-look, early-twenties mold:
Kevin Alston - 21
Omar Gonzalez - 21
Brandon McDonald - 23
Alejandro Bedoya - 22
Geoff Cameron - 24
Brad Evans - 24
Chris Pontius - 22
Justin Braun - 22
Robbie Findley - 22
Marcus Tracy - 22
Trecker's probably right. There probably aren't any diamonds to be mined out of this group. But I'd rather have Bradley taking a look at them in person than to assume as much, and I don't see a problem with throwing a handful of players up against the wall and looking to see if anything sticks. The lack of depth in the program overall almost makes it critical that the head coach do so.
Unfortunately, until American kids are coming through club youth academies, getting enough playing and practice time to develop earlier, camps like this one are a necessary evil for US Soccer.
Scan the American soccer blogosphere any given week and you're likely to come across something that hits on at least one of the following topics:
Promotion/Relegation
Youth Development
Signing/Finding Talent
Sometimes, the pieces written on these subjects are intelligent, well-reasoned, and unique. More often than not, however, they're none of the above; predominantly, they're shallow, naive, simplistic, and ignore serious problems with the approaches they present.
Although not a blogger in the usual sense, Jimmy Conrad has decided to weigh in with his own thoughts on each of the above mentioned topics. It's the question everyone wants to ask, and so many think they might have the answer to: How do we, the American soccer community, take the game to the next level in this country?
Jimmy's first suggestion, a two-tiered MLS that includes promotion and relegation, goes nowhere unique, even if it is a reasonable approach to the "problem". But Conrad, who says twenty MLS teams could be divided into two leagues of ten, glosses over that tricky issue of forcing certain teams to start in the second division, using arbitrary criteria and exceptions to determine the split of first level and second level clubs.
Where Conrad has struck a chord was with his second two suggestions, both related directly to player development; unfortunately though, the prerequisite action, having MLS become a "monopoly" by buying up every professional American soccer league (including indoor), is so large a leap for MLS that it makes me cringe to read it. Why would an organization that imposes strict budgetary control and limits costs in every way possible step up and make such a large financial commitment? The league's owners may have deep pockets individually, but they have shown that as a collective group frugality wins out over all else. The move makes sense as a way to gain control and restructure an American soccer pyramid that has entirely too many cooks in the kitchen at the moment, but it would also be incredibly expensive. It's tantalizingly visionary, but depressingly impossible.
Delving into Conrad's thoughts on what to do with those lower division and indoor leagues once they're under the MLS umbrella seems pointless because it's so unlikely, but he does make solid suggestions for how to help young players gain crucial experience. Most unique is his thought on having young MLS player under a certain threshold of playing time in the outdoor season (he set this as 1,000 minutes) play indoor during the winter; with the greater pressure and faster pace of indoor soccer, the idea is that young players will improve their skills, speed up their development, and be better prepared to play in Major League Soccer. I can find no fault with Conrad's logic.
Following this portion of his column, Conrad asks a cynical question that had certainly run through the mind of many an MLS fan:
What is the main goal of having MLS in place? Is it about land and money and tax write-offs, or is it about something more?
Conrad closes out with his thoughts on the draft, calling for it to end and end immediately. I agree wholeheartedly, and find Conrad's suggestions for signing college players reasonable. My thoughts on the draft continue to be that it does not force MLS clubs to build a proper development system, and the longer they wait, the longer it will be until MLS is able to completely stand on its own as a respectable and established professional football league. Delaying the inevitable is doing MLS no good, and the first step in making the clubs learn to fly is to push them out of the nest without the net of the draft to catch them.
Again, Jimmy treads no ground that hasn't been covered many, many times before. But he does present specific ideas on how to make the system better, and while deeper analysis, not to mention that annoying business a multi-million dollar investement, might poke holes in his concepts, it's nice to see someone who actually plays the game step out with radical thoughts.
I'm curious as to what the MFUSA readership makes of Conrad's vision of the future, so don't hold back.
Give it up for the Ivy League, pumping out quality articles American soccer; just yesterday, I linked to a story from a Princeton student, who related his experiences during the Summer of Soccer. Now, a Harvard writer weighs in with the first in a series of pieces on college soccer's place in the greater American soccer environment.
The writer sees the influence of the college game waning, and points to the American U-20 teams and it's makeup as an example. For many ardent soccer fans, the movement towards more professionals at that level is a good thing, and something we believe will ultimately benefit our professional league and our senior national team (something with the writer admits is probably true); the marginalization of college soccer, and the disappointment of many that it's happening, is a dividing line in the community that while unlikely to cause any debilitating splits, does color our relationships. There doesn't seem to much middle ground; either you love college soccer and see it as an important part of the American game, or you dismiss it out of hand as an impediment to the development of better players.
- More work from the college kids, and this time it's an opinion piece on why President Obama should be focusing his attention on securing the World Cup in 2018 or 2022 rather than a Chicago Olympics in 2016. I agree completely, though I fully admit it's for selfish reasons, and I'm not really convinced that the President's push for the Olympics precludes the US from getting another World Cup, or really has any bearing on the decision of FIFA. If it is an either/or proposition, I would obviously come down on the side of soccer; a nationwide event of the World Cup's caliber, and for all of the reasons the writer mentions, would ultimately bring more than the one-city, scorched-earth nature of the Olympics. But hey, I'm a sports nut, so I say bring them both on.
- The growing trend of American club ownership in Europe may not be extending its reach to Italy after all; Texas tycoon Timothy Barton's bid to buy Serie A club Bari has hit a snag, despite earlier reports that it was all but done. I'm not overly concerned about club ownership, generally, though I would be lying if I said I didn't hope that an American owner would lead to more European opportunities for our players. "A" doesn't necessarily lead to "B", however, so the collapse of Barton's Bari bid is more notable because Americans have yet to dip their toes into European waters outside of England to this point.
Deep Cuts appears daily and is an attempt to bring you soccer news and commentary from off the beaten path or of particular interest to American soccer fans. If you come across something you think would make a good Deep Cut, please send it along to matchfitusa@gmail.com.
6+5 hit my inbox today, in the form of a Jack Bell interview with the president of La Liga, José Luis Astiazarán. Astiazarán discussed the potential impact of the rule on his league, clearly stating that for the La Liga, it's no big deal.
The interview, related to American soccer only by later questions revolving around Spanish investment in the U.S. and the prospects of American players in Spain, immediately got me thinking about how 6+5 might impact Major League Soccer. While the richest European leagues may scramble to rework their rosters to comply with the rule, our little American league is, and should continue to be, American enough that the impact would be minimal.
But is that really the case? Besides the obvious and immediate nature of the rule, something MLS is in no position to worry about, there might be a few extraneous and more long-reaching effects.
Current roster rules make it possible for MLS clubs to field more than five internationals, though because the league uses citizenship and residency status to determine a players provenance rather than their national team eligibility, there may some overlap that makes it difficult to properly assess the effect.
For example: Bakary Soumare is not an international player under MLS rules, but would be according to FIFA, as he is now capped by Mali and is therefore ineligible to play for the U.S.
6+5 is intended to restore a national identity to domestic leagues, something big clubs and big money has reduced significantly in recent times. For some, the effects could be large; England is the most obvious example, and the debate rages on there as to whether or not the rule is a positive step or an infringement on the right of clubs field the best possible team (and is therefore an impediment to quality).
Let's put aside the immediate impact of the rule on the field, because as I mentioned, it really doesn't apply to MLS (for now, although there are a few exceptions). Instead, I'm suggesting that 6+5 will ensure that MLS will remain primarily American despite any efforts by those in power to increase the number of internationals in a bid to improve league quality in a rapid manner.
The appeal of Major League Soccer, and the strategy it uses to increase its appeal, is a delicate balancing act. The league can choose the slow and steady path it is currently on, relying heavily on Americans, or it can attempt a quick jump by increasing foreign roster spots. The former could keep the league stagnate and leave it as it currently is, generally unable to attract soccer fans who turn their back on the league. The latter might improve quality and appeal to those fans, but it could jeopardize the league's ability to develop American talent on a broad scale.
While I'm not keen on the idea that Major League Soccer should, or has an obligation to, serve as some sort of National Team proving ground, I understand the need for it to be a place for Americans to play. American players will continue to leave the country to ply their trade in greater and greater numbers as time goes on, but there will also be those that have no other option than to play in the United States. MLS should absolutely be a place for the best Americans to get on the field, and in numbers that ensure it remains American at its core.
Luckily enough, that's exactly what 6+5 is intended to do.
I'm tempted to expound on this further, and I definitely want to make the point that I'm not arguing for 6+5. It's very possibly that the rule will never go beyond the discussion phase, therefore making my point a moot one. But if it does, and if some are worried that MLS could move too far away from the American player, then the rule will keep it from going too far.
There seems to be some question these days about what exactly Major League Soccer's responsibility is as a developer of American players for National Team duty.
To be honest, I don't understand why there's a question.
I've never believed that it's the league, ostensibly a money-making enterprise, who is ultimately responsible for developing young American players. Sure, a part of Major League Soccer's original mandate may have been to help improve the Nats, but I would hope that we're past that at this point.
If the U.S. is ever going to be serious footballing nation, we need to stop expecting our domestic league to be a "training ground" for American players just because they're American.
The National Team pool will be deeper and of higher quality when clubs, rather than high school and colleges, take on the burden of developing the next generation of players.
Over time, I've become a staunch opponent of the SuperDraft. Until the safety net of the draft is taken away and MLS clubs are forced to develop their own talent, the development of American players will stagnate. The current situation allows MLS teams to dip into the college ranks for new players every year, rather than scouting for talent the way clubs abroad do.
The draft was (and perhaps still is to a point) a necessity. At the outset of MLS play, American soccer simply didn't have the infrastructure in place to allow for a traditional academy system. Money concerns rule, and I'm willing to allow the league and its clubs some leeway; but we're coming up on fifteen years of competition, and we've yet to see a player rise through the ranks and contribute to the senior club in any significant way. That simply doesn't seem right to me.
American soccer is a hodge-podge of programs, high schools, and club teams. None seem to be able to do the job individually, and even collectively often come up short. By the time college players are ready to contribute (or are ready to be drafted) on a professional level, they're already used up a few years of their prime. It's inefficient and disturbing, if only because those players are already two to three years behind their European, South American, and even Mexican counterparts.
As Americans, we seem to be comfortable with allowing soccer players to follow a time line that handicaps both them and the clubs. Training time in a structured professional environment, without the distractions of college life, is invaluable. The status quo is allowed to pervade because it's the "easy" and cheapest way to do business. Both MLS and its member clubs seem content to let the American college system do the work, then pluck players who may or may not be ready to contribute at an age when they should much more advanced.
MLS teams seem unwilling or unable to properly scout this country. I refuse to believe that American players would be held back, or that the talent pool would be diluted by expansion, if the situation changed and clubs did a better job of finding American talent. Too many American kids are either ignored or missed completely. MLS teams, without incentive to fill up academies with talented local youngsters, go abroad for talent first.
Bottom line? The number of international roster spots is not the issue. In the short term, some American players may lose their jobs and be forced to catch on in USL. But if USSF and MLS move in the right direction and step up the academy system, more American players would be ready to contribute as professional at an earlier age, mitigating the need to look abroad. The Nats pool would deepen and improve, and everyone would be happy. Right?
For the time being, I suppose the foreign player issue could be argued either way. If you put more into the USMNT than you do your club, you may prefer MLS to be the Nats development program, remaining a overwhelmingly American league. If you want a strong league better positioned to compete on an international level, you might prefer more of a foreign presence.
I'm not sure why those two things have to mutually exclusive.
We won't actually know if they are until club academies become the predominant development method for American players. Until then, it's impossible to know if allowing MLS to become more "foreign" (which I don't believe is a foregone conclusion by the way) will be a detriment to our National Team aspirations.
I'm a bit all over the place with this, but I hope I managed to get some of my point across. Share you thoughts, let me know where I'm going wrong, or explain to me why a balance isn't possible.
