A few days ago, I posted some numbers about the US central midfield and the effects of individuals and midfield partnerships on the number of goals scored and conceded. Two general trends emerged from the analysis; that replacing more defensive players with more offensive players increases the number of goals conceded and that replacing defensive players with more offensive players does not increase the number of goals scored. While there are sample size and control issues in the analysis, and I fully concede that the results are not significant to a level of confidence that I would make the decision of who should play and who should sit on them, they raise interesting questions. Why is the US so reliant on a defensive midfielder? Why does playing an offensive midfielder not result in more goals for the US?

The Defensive Mid

Fair warning: the hypothesis laid out here is supported with statistics that are not statistically significant within scientific confidence levels (the sample sizes are too small and I’m too lazy to figure out the confidence intervals), nor are they properly controlled to specifically isolate the variable, but they are interesting and pass the smell test.

That the addition of more defensive-minded midfielders lowers the goals conceded rate should surprise no one. If that rate went up, why would you ever play with one? However, more than just a general effect on the game, who the US has conceded goals to when a DM is on versus not on the field is telling of what they bring to the table. During its 13 “A” games, the US has conceded 18 goals; 8 to strikers, 7 to midfielders, 3 to defenders. Below is a table that looks at the positions being played by those who scored against the US broken out by the presence of at least one defensive mid.

	Minutes	GC	FW	CM	LM	CB	RB
DM	739	7	4	2	0	1	0
No DM	470	11	4	3	2	0	2

For the US, the presence of a defensive mid seems to have a twofold effect. First, it has a direct effect of reducing strikes directly from central midfielders for .6 goals/GE to .25 goals/GE. Second, but more important number wise, it seems to have an indirect effect at reducing strikes from the rest of the pitch. LMs and RBs should be the primary defensive responsibilities of our RBs and LMs respectively. The two side back positions and Donovan while playing left mid are the most likely candidates for pinching in to fill central midfield gaps that occur when a defensive midfielder is not in the lineup. This means that their primary defensive responsibilities are left unattended resulting in a probable increase in opportunities for opposing side midfielders and backs.

Based on his playing time and style it should be no surprise that Michael Bradley was the most defensive-minded midfielder on the pitch for all 470 minutes when there has been no true DM. The results are as much an indictment of his inability to shut down the midfield as it is a testament to the ability of Clark and Mastroeni to do so. Until the unlikely event of playing a meaningful game without Bradley or a DM in the lineup, it is impossible to know if the US needs to play with a DM or just that whenever Bradley plays, he must be paired with a defensive midfielder.

The Lost Talent

That offensive minded midfielders do not contribute more to the goal scoring is more of a conundrum. Logically, more possession be it through dribbling or passing should lead to more goal scoring opportunities. In the interest of entertainment and mental gymnastics, I am going to take a shot at a theory that is definitely still a work in progress. In fact, I am not sure that I believe what is written below, but it is the best I could come up with and I hope it stimulates a good conversation in the comments...

What if the current US strikers are not good at playing in a possession based offense? The list of true strikers that the US has used in “A” team matches is Altidore, Casey, Ching, and Davies. Here’s what I would judge as each respective player’s greatest strength: strength to out physical a defender, heading, holding up the ball, and speed.

Scoring in a counter attacking and set piece offense relies on these traits. The ability to shield off a defender when both are racing for a pass up the wing loses its effectiveness when playing a half-field offense. The ability to head in a cross is less necessary when the attack is built through the middle as opposed to the wings. Pulling down a long ball and holding it for an on-rushing midfielder loses its effectiveness when there are no long balls. The ability to blow past a defender on a release loses its effectiveness when the defense is already settled in the box. To be an effective striker in a possession offense the most important traits are not strength, speed, or height, but are positioning, timing, and vision. While I’m confident that Altidore and Davies will develop this, their national team and club playing experience until now (primarily New York Red Bulls and Hammarby) has not made this an area of expertise.

Someone who does have those abilities is Clint Dempsey. With his questionable looking performances on the right side and the emergence of Feilhaber and Holden as viable replacements, a move up top for Dempsey could be a step in the right direction for building a possession side. Kenny Cooper is another who jumps to mind as having better than average positioning. What has kept him off the team or on the bench is that he is not as quick, is not great with his head, and does not use his strength to take on defenders like the other strikers above who are more suited to a counter attacking style. Either or both of these players would likely raise the effectiveness of Torres and Feilhaber. The question remains is the benefit to Torres’ and Feilhaber’s style outweighed by the loss of effectiveness in the counterattacking game?

Putting together a best XI is not about picking the best eleven players at their respective positions. It is about choosing players with complementary skills. The strikers that play now are chosen because their skills mesh with a back line that has a propensity to panic against high line pressure and serve long balls down the field. They mesh with the apparent need (see above) to play a defensive midfielder whose passing ability does not fit into a possession scheme. They mesh with Donovan’s ability to place perfect outlet passes on the counter. When Feilhaber or Torres take the field, none of these things change. Counterattack and set piece opportunities come at the same rate. I would argue that this is why the goal scoring rate with them in does not change. Perhaps, it is a case where their talents are wasted on the team.

For you conspiracy theorists out there, if this analysis is correct, then using a counter attacking style makes it a lot easier to justify playing a central midfielder who has a knack for finding the back of the net on the counterattack and set pieces himself instead of creating for others, i.e. Michael Bradley.

Finally, if you want to see a more possession style played by the US and like one of the guys currently sitting on the bench or not making the team, I propose this as the most viable (Bob might actually consider playing it the next time Michael gets suspended) option:

GK: Howard
Def: Spector, Onyewu, Bocanegra, Pearce
Mid: Feilhaber/Holden, Feilhaber/Torres, Clark, Donovan
FW: Dempsey, Altidore

Or you can just wait a couple years until Jozy’s and Charlie’s position, timing, and vision are much better and the US can use either of these attacking styles effectively.

There. I’ve given you all some talking points. Argue below.